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Back in the early 1990s, economists and policymakers had high expec-
tations about the prospects for capital market development in emerging
economies.1 This led to signiﬁcant reforms, including ﬁnancial liberaliza-
tion, the establishment of stock exchanges and bond markets, and the
development of regulatory and supervisory frameworks. These reforms,
together with improved macroeconomic fundamentals and capital market-
related reforms, such as the privatization of state-owned enterprises and
the shift to privately managed deﬁned contribution pension systems, were
expected to foster ﬁnancial development.2




Whither Latin America? 
Augusto de la Torre, Juan Carlos Gozzi, 
and Sergio L. Schmukler
Augusto de la Torre is chief economist for Latin America and the Caribbean, The World
Bank. Juan Carlos Gozzi is a researcher at The World Bank and a Ph.D. student in econom-
ics at Brown University. Sergio L. Schmukler is lead economist in the Development Research
Group of The World Bank.
This paper is part of a broader study on capital markets, conducted at the Chief Economist
Oﬃce, Latin America and the Caribbean Region, The World Bank, available at http://
www.worldbank.org/laccapitalmarkets. We thank participants at the PUC-Rio de Janeiro
(Brazil) conference for very useful discussions. We are particularly grateful to Sebastian Ed-
wards, Márcio G. P. Garcia, Eduardo Loyo, Ugo Panizza, and two anonymous referees for
very helpful comments. The ﬁndings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper
are entirely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of The World Bank.
1. Capital market development has been deemed an important goal, as growing evidence
supports the view that a sound ﬁnancial system is not just correlated with a healthy economy,
but actually causes economic growth. See Levine (2005) for a comprehensive review of the lit-
erature on the ﬁnance-growth nexus.
2. These expectations were supported by the cross-sectional empirical evidence on the de-
terminants of ﬁnancial development, which shows that countries with sounder macroeco-
nomic policies, better institutional environments, and more eﬃcient legal systems, especially
regarding the protection of creditors and minority shareholders, have more developed do-markets in many emerging economies has been disappointing. Although
some countries experienced growth of their domestic markets, this growth
in most cases has not been as signiﬁcant as the one witnessed by industri-
alized nations. Other countries experienced an actual deterioration of their
capital markets. Stock markets in many developing countries have seen
listings and liquidity decrease, as a growing number of ﬁrms have cross-
listed and raised capital in international ﬁnancial centers, such as New
York and London.3 In many emerging economies, stock markets remain
highly illiquid and segmented, with trading and capitalization concen-
trated on few stocks. Also, bonds tend to be concentrated at the short end
of the maturity spectrum and denominated in foreign currency, exposing
governments and ﬁrms to maturity and currency risks.4 The large number
of policy initiatives and the disappointing performance of capital markets
have left policymakers without clear guidance on how to revise the reform
agenda going forward, and many do not envision a bright future for do-
mestic capital markets in developing countries.
In this paper, we analyze the state of capital market in Latin America
and discuss how to rethink the reform agenda going forward in light of this
evidence. Our focus on Latin American countries is motivated by the fact
that these countries were at the forefront of the capital market reform pro-
cess over the last decades.5 Despite the intense reform eﬀort, capital mar-
kets in the region seem to have lagged behind, not only relative to developed
countries, but also compared to emerging economies in other regions, such
as East Asia (de la Torre and Schmukler 2006). Analyzing the experience
of Latin American countries may provide signiﬁcant lessons for the capi-
tal market reform agenda going forward, which may also apply to emerg-
ing economies in other regions.
We start by documenting the extent of capital market development in
Latin America and comparing it to other regions. We then use formal
analyses to further understand how the state of stock markets in the region
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mestic ﬁnancial markets (see, for example, Boyd, Levine, and Smith 2001; La Porta, Lopez de
Silanes, and Shleifer 2006; and La Porta et al., 1997, 1998).
3. Karolyi (2004) and Moel (2001) oﬀer evidence on how the use of American Depositary
Receipts (ADRs) is related to stock market development in emerging economies. Levine and
Schmukler (2006a,b) analyze the impact of migration to international markets on domestic
market trading and liquidity.
4. See Mihaljek, Scatigna, and Villar (2002) for an overview of the characteristics of bond
markets in emerging economies.
5. Starting in the late 1980s and early 1990s, most Latin American countries implemented
macro stabilization programs and liberalized their ﬁnancial systems, ending a long period of
financial repression. Apart from macro stabilization and liberalization, governments through-
out the region approved new legislation aimed at creating the proper market infrastructure
and institutions for capital markets to ﬂourish. These capital market reforms were comple-
mented in a number of cases by privatization eﬀorts and by comprehensive pension system
reforms. See de la Torre and Schmukler (2006) for an overview of the capital market reform
process in Latin America.diﬀers from that in other regions. In particular, we are interested in assess-
ing whether there is a gap between fundamentals and policies, on the one
hand, and actual stock market development, on the other. This issue is
highly relevant for the policy debate. The observed lack of capital market
development in Latin America may be a consequence of the region’s poor
fundamentals, suggesting the need to push further ahead in the reform
eﬀort to achieve a higher level of economic and institutional development,
which in turn should result in more developed capital markets. On the
other hand, the ﬁnding of a shortfall between actual capital market devel-
opment in the region and the level of development predicted by its eco-
nomic and institutional fundamentals could indicate that reforms and im-
provements in these fundamentals have not had the expected results so far.
This suggests that it might be necessary to revise the reform agenda and re-
lated expectations to take into account certain characteristics of these
countries that may limit the scope for developing deep domestic securities
markets. Finally, we discuss alternative ways of interpreting the evidence,
with the goal of drawing lessons for the reform agenda going forward.
The evidence shows that despite the intense reform eﬀort, capital mar-
kets in Latin America remain underdeveloped compared to markets in
East Asia and developed countries. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that stock mar-
kets in the region are below what can be expected, given economic and in-
stitutional fundamentals. In particular, we ﬁnd that there is a shortfall in
domestic stock market activity (market capitalization, trading, and capital
raising) in Latin America after controlling for many factors, including per
capita income, macroeconomic policies, and measures of the legal and in-
stitutional environment.
We discuss how diﬀerent lines of thought would assess this gap between
predicted and observed outcomes. This exercise helps to gain a better un-
derstanding of the possible reasons for this divergence and sharpen the cri-
teria to guide an appropriate reformulation of policy recommendations.
We argue that two stylized views dominate the current reform debate in this
regard. The ﬁrst view, encapsulated in the message “be patient and re-
double the eﬀort,” contends that the gap between expectations and ob-
served outcomes is due to the combination of impatience with imperfect
and incomplete reform eﬀorts. This view argues that past reforms were ba-
sically right, that reforms needed in the future are essentially known, and
that reforms have long gestation periods before producing visible results.6
The second view, encapsulated in the message “get the sequence right,”
claims that the gap is due to faulty reform sequencing. This view draws at-
tention to the problems that arise when some reforms are implemented
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6. Renditions of this view, in the more general context of assessing the impact of reforms on
economic development, can be found, for instance, in Fernandez Arias and Montiel (2001),
Krueger (2004), Singh et al. (2005), and World Bank (1997).ahead of others and argues that key preconditions should be met before
fully liberalizing domestic ﬁnancial markets and allowing free interna-
tional capital mobility.7
Though diﬀering in diagnoses and policy prescriptions, these views are
not necessarily incompatible, and both capture important aspects of the
problem at hand, yielding considerable insights. Our main argument, how-
ever, is that neither of the two views may adequately address a number of
salient questions posed by the evidence. We therefore propose a third, com-
plementary view that is much less prescriptive. This view can be encapsu-
lated in the message “revisit basic issues and reshape expectations.”8 It 
contends that, although more research is needed, it is diﬃcult to pinpoint
which factors may explain the relative underdevelopment of domestic cap-
ital markets in Latin America. Future research might ﬁnd that the gap be-
tween predicted and observed outcomes is explained by some factor not in-
cluded in the long list of controls used in this paper. Nevertheless, we claim
that there might as well be important deﬁciencies with the expectations
and design of past reforms. This view argues that policy initiatives need to
take into account the intrinsic characteristics of developing countries (such
as small size, lack of risk diversiﬁcation opportunities, presence of weak
currencies, and prevalence of systemic risk) and how these features limit
the scope for developing deep domestic capital markets in a context of in-
ternational ﬁnancial integration. These limitations are diﬃcult to over-
come by the reform process. In other words, even if emerging economies
carry out all the necessary reforms, they might not obtain a domestic cap-
ital market development comparable to that of industrialized countries.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 presents de-
scriptive statistics on capital market development in Latin America and
compares them to other regions. Section 4.3 describes the econometric es-
timations of whether stock market development in Latin America is close
to the level predicted by fundamentals. Section 4.4 discusses the typologi-
cal views on why the state of capital markets is diﬀerent than expected. Sec-
tion 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Capital Markets in Latin America
This section analyzes the state of capital markets in Latin American
countries and compares them to those in other countries. Figure 4.1shows
diﬀerent indicators of ﬁnancial development for selected Latin American,
East Asian, and developed countries. In particular, this ﬁgure presents
data on credit to the private sector by ﬁnancial institutions, stock market
capitalization, and the amount outstanding of private sector domestic
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7. This view is articulated, for example, in Bhagwati (1998) and Stiglitz (2002).
8. This view is described in more detail in de la Torre and Schmukler (2006).bonds, all as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), at year-end
2004. As this ﬁgure shows, although there are diﬀerences among Latin
American countries, most countries in the region have signiﬁcantly smaller
ﬁnancial markets than G7 and East Asian countries. Chile is the only ex-
ception, as the size of its ﬁnancial markets, especially its stock market,
vastly exceeds that of other Latin American countries and also compares
favorably with ﬁnancial markets in developed and East Asian countries.
However, analyzing measures of actual stock market activity, such as value
traded, shows that Chile’s stock market remains underdeveloped com-
pared to markets in East Asia and developed countries.9
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 display average values of diﬀerent measures of stock
market development for Latin American, G7, and East Asian countries for
the years 1990 and 2004. As ﬁgure 4.2 shows, stock markets in Latin Amer-
ica have grown considerably over the last decades. The average domestic
stock market capitalization in terms of GDP in the seven largest markets
in the region (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Ven-
ezuela) more than tripled between 1990 and 2004. Value traded in domes-
tic stock markets also increased signiﬁcantly during this period, from an
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9. Value traded over GDP reached 12.4 percent in Chile in 2004, compared to 65.5 percent
in France, 74.2 percent in Japan, and 165.9 percent in the United States. The East Asian coun-
tries presented in the graph also had signiﬁcantly higher levels of trading activity than Chile,
with value traded over GDP reaching 94 percent in Korea, 50.8 percent in Malaysia, and 66.7
percent in Thailand.
Fig. 4.1 Domestic ﬁnancial sector development across countries
Note: This ﬁgure shows credit to the private sector by ﬁnancial institutions over GDP, do-
mestic stock market capitalization over GDP, and the amount outstanding of private sector
domestic bonds over GDP at year-end 2004 for selected countries.
Sources: BIS, IMF International Financial Statistics, S&P Emerging Markets Database,
World Bank.average of 2.0 percent of GDP in 1990 to 6.1 percent in 2004. Despite this
strong growth, stock markets in Latin America are still small when com-
pared to those in other regions. At the end of 2004, stock market capital-
ization in this region reached 42.3 percent of GDP, compared to 93.6 and
147.1 percent in G7 and East Asian countries, respectively. Regional diﬀer-
ences are more striking when analyzing trading activity, with Latin Amer-
ican countries appearing to be caught in a low liquidity trap. While value
traded in domestic stock markets stood at 6.1 percent of GDP in Latin
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Fig. 4.2 Domestic stock market development
Notes This ﬁgure shows market capitalization over GDP and value traded domestically over
GDP. The series are averages across countries. The data for G7 countries are averages for
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The
data for East Asian countries are averages for Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand. The data for Latin American countries are averages for
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela.
Sources: S&P Emerging Markets Database, World Bank.America in 2004, it reached 92.2 percent in G7 countries and 104.5 percent
in East Asia.10
Similar regional diﬀerences are visible when analyzing capital raising ac-
tivity (ﬁgure 4.3). Capital raised as a percentage of GDP in Latin American
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10. We also estimated the ﬁgures for East Asia excluding Hong Kong, as it may serve as a
regional ﬁnancial center for corporations from mainland China and other Asian countries.
Although this reduces the average values for East Asian countries, these countries still show
signiﬁcantly higher stock market capitalization and trading than Latin American countries.
When excluding Hong Kong, the average capitalization for the remaining East Asian coun-
tries included in the ﬁgures stood at 83.6 percent of GDP in 2004, whereas their value traded
in that year reached 77 percent of GDP.
Fig. 4.3 Domestic stock market development
Notes: This ﬁgure shows capital raised over GDP and the number of listed domestic ﬁrms.
The series are averages across countries. The data for G7 countries are averages for Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The data for East
Asian countries are averages for Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Taiwan, and Thailand. The data for Latin American countries are averages for Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela.
Sources: S&P Emerging Markets Database, World Federation of Exchanges, World Bank.stock markets is lower than in other regions, reaching 0.5 percent in 2004,
compared to 1.5 percent in G7 countries and 5.9 percent in East Asia.11The
average number of ﬁrms listed in domestic stock markets in Latin America
has decreased over the last decades, from 232 in 1990 to 174 in 2004.12 This
reduction stands in contrast to the increase in the number of listings expe-
rienced by both G7 and East Asian countries during this period.13
Domestic bond markets in both developed and developing countries
have experienced considerable growth over the last decades. This growth
was especially pronounced in East Asia following the 1997 crisis, as gov-
ernments and ﬁrms increasingly switched to bond ﬁnancing.14 In Latin
America, most progress has been made in the development of public bond
markets, with the stock of domestic government bonds outstanding in-
creasing from 12.3 percent of GDP in 1993 to 20.7 percent in 2004 (ﬁgure
4.4).15 Public sector bond markets in the region present a development 
level close to that of East Asian markets. On the other hand, in spite of their
growth over the last decades, private bond markets in Latin America re-
main underdeveloped. The amount outstanding of domestic private sector
bonds in the region stood at 10.7 percent of GDP in 2004, compared to an
average of 36.3 percent in East Asia and 47.7 percent in G7 countries.
4.3 Empirical Analysis of Stock Market Development in Latin America
The data on stock and bond markets in Latin America presented in the
previous section show that, although securities markets in the region have
grown substantially since 1990, Latin American capital markets remain
underdeveloped when compared to markets in industrial and East Asian
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11. Capital raising activity tends to be very volatile, varying widely from year to year. This
could generate some concerns about whether the years presented in ﬁgure 4.3 are representa-
tive of the general patterns. However, similar regional diﬀerences are visible if one considers
average values from 1990 to 2004. The average annual amount of capital raised in domestic
stock markets in Latin American countries for this period reached 0.8 percent of GDP, com-
pared to 1.3 percent in G7 countries and 4.6 percent in East Asia.
12. The reduction in the number of listed ﬁrms has been associated with the increasing mi-
gration of Latin American ﬁrms to international markets. Merger and acquisition activity, as
well as majority shareholders trying to increase their controlling stakes, have also been
brought forward as possible explanations for the growing stock market delistings in Latin
America (see de la Torre and Schmukler 2006).
13. Diﬀerent explanations have been proposed for the diverging trend in stock market list-
ings between Latin America and East Asia. For one, unlike the European and U.S. stock mar-
kets, which performed well during the 1990s, stock markets in Hong Kong and Tokyo, the nat-
ural candidates for migration in Asia, have not done well in recent years (World Bank 2004).
14. Following the ﬁnancial crisis, it was argued that capital markets in East Asia had not
been diversiﬁed enough and that well-developed bond markets would have made several
Asian economies less vulnerable to the crisis (see, for example, Batten and Kim 2001; Herring
and Chatusripitak 2001).
15. The sample of East Asian and Latin American countries and the period presented in
this ﬁgure diﬀer from those used in ﬁgures 4.2 and 4.3 due to data availability.countries. This evidence suggests that the high expectations of the early
1990s about capital market development in the region have not been met.
An open question is whether this lack of development is a consequence of
the failure to build an environment conducive to capital market develop-
ment, despite the intense reform eﬀort, or if even when Latin American
countries have built such an environment, markets have failed to develop
as predicted. In this section we focus on answering this question. Doing so
requires a formal analysis of the determinants of capital market develop-
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Fig. 4.4 Domestic bond market development
Notes: This ﬁgure shows the amounts outstanding of public and private sector bonds in do-
mestic markets over GDP. The series are averages across countries. The data for G7 countries
are averages for Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. The data for East Asian countries are averages for Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Tai-
wan, and Thailand. The data for Latin American countries are averages for Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Mexico, and Peru.
Sources: BIS, World Bank.ment and then testing whether, once we control for those determinants,
Latin American countries have less-developed capital markets. We focus
our analysis on stock markets, as data on diﬀerent measures of stock mar-
ket development are available for a large cross-section of countries and a
relatively long time series. In contrast, comprehensive data on domestic
bond market development are available for a shorter period and a smaller
sample of economies, making it more diﬃcult to capture diﬀerences be-
tween Latin America and other regions. We ﬁrst describe the dependent
and explanatory variables and the methodology we use, then present the
regression results, and ﬁnally discuss some robustness tests.
4.3.1 Data and Methodology
For the empirical analysis of stock markets, we follow Claessens, Klinge-
biel, and Schmukler (2006), who analyze the factors driving domestic stock
market development and internationalization. We use three measures of
domestic stock market development: market capitalization, value traded,
and capital raised, all as a percentage of GDP.16
The data on market capitalization and value traded on the major local
stock exchanges come from the Standard & Poor’s Global Stock Markets
Factbook and cover the period 1975 to 2004 for 117 countries. The amount
of equity capital raised by domestic ﬁrms in the local stock market comes
from the World Federation of Exchanges and covers the period 1982 to
2004 for 46 countries.
In terms of explanatory variables, we include several factors found to be
important in the literature on stock market development. First, because
more-developed countries tend to have deeper domestic stock markets
(see, for example, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, and Shleifer 2006; La Porta
et al. 1997; and Rajan and Zingales 2003), we use GDP per capita as a mea-
sure of countries’ overall economic development. Higher income coun-
tries also tend to have better institutional and legal environments, which
have been found to matter for ﬁnancial development (see Beck and Levine
2005).17To further address this issue, we include an index of the strength of
minority shareholder rights from Djankov et al. (2008).18
The regressions include two alternative indicators of macroeconomic
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16. We also estimated regressions using turnover (deﬁned as value traded over market cap-
italization) and obtained results similar to those reported below.
17. Gross domestic product per capita is highly correlated with diﬀerent measures of the in-
stitutional environment. For our sample, the correlation between GDP per capita and indexes
of bureaucratic quality, corruption, and law and order reported by the International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG) service is 0.73, 0.67 and 0.71, respectively, and in all cases it is signiﬁcant
at the 1 percent level. All the results reported in the paper are robust to replacing GDP per
capita with any of these measures of the institutional environment.
18. Djankov et al. (2008) present revised estimates of the antidirector rights index from La
Porta et al. (1998) and expand the sample of countries covered. All the results reported in the
paper are robust to replacing this updated index with the original measure from La Porta et
al. (1998).soundness, the annual inﬂation rate and the government deﬁcit over GDP,
given that a better macroeconomic environment promotes ﬁnancial devel-
opment (see Bencivenga and Smith 1992; Boyd, Levine, and Smith 2001;
and Huybens and Smith 1999).
We include three alternative variables to control for the extent of ﬁnan-
cial openness and liberalization, as that has been found to aﬀect stock
market development (see Bekaert and Harvey 2000, 2003; Edison and
Warnock 2003; Henry 2000; and Levine and Zervos 1998). First, we in-
clude a de jure measure of capital account liberalization constructed by
Chinn and Ito (2006). Second, as we are analyzing stock markets, we also
use a de jure indicator of stock market liberalization. Our data for dating
the liberalization of stock markets come from three sources: Bekaert, Har-
vey, and Lundblad (2005), who present oﬃcial liberalization dates, mostly
for developing countries; Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003), who construct
an index of the extent of stock market liberalization which also includes de-
veloped economies; and Vinhas de Souza (2005), who extends this index to
Eastern European countries.19 We combine these three sources to get the
widest possible coverage.20 Finally, as a measure of de facto openness, we
use equity ﬂows, including both portfolio equity ﬂows and foreign direct
investment (FDI) ﬂows, relative to GDP. This variable captures the eﬀec-
tive integration with international capital markets and the de facto open-
ness of the stock market; it can also be viewed as a measure of foreign de-
mand for domestic equity.21
We also control for the possibility that local stock market development
is aﬀected by the growth opportunities that ﬁrms face. Growth opportuni-
ties may be particularly relevant for explaining capital raising behavior, as
the literature on initial public oﬀerings (IPOs) has highlighted (see Ritter
and Welch [2002] for a review). Countries with better growth opportunities
may need larger stock markets to satisfy a higher demand for external
funds. Therefore, we include the global growth opportunities index from
Bekaert et al. (2006), which measures how each country’s industry mix is
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19. For the data from Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) and Vinhas de Souza (2005), we
consider the ﬁrst year when a country’s stock market is fully liberalized as the liberalization
date. Alternatively, we also used the date of the ﬁrst partial liberalization and obtained simi-
lar results.
20. We also ran regressions using only the Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005) dates and
their “ﬁrst sign” stock market liberalization measure, which is based on the earliest of three
possibilities: the launching of a country fund, an ADR announcement, and the oﬃcial liber-
alization date. We obtained similar results using these measures.
21. We include FDI ﬂows because those ﬂows, apart from new investment, also represent
purchases of existing equity. In fact, equity ﬂows are classiﬁed as FDI ﬂows when they repre-
sent a purchase of at least 10 percent of a company’s equity. Note that this variable could be
aﬀected by endogeneity, as foreign investment tends to go to countries with more developed
ﬁnancial markets. To reduce this potential problem and because good instruments are hard
to obtain, we use this variable lagged one period. To check that our results are not aﬀected by
the inclusion of this variable, we also report estimations without it and ﬁnd that the coeﬃ-
cients on the rest of the variables are unaﬀected.priced in global capital markets, using the price earnings ratios of global
industry portfolios.22
We additionally include GDP as a control variable in our regressions.
Securities markets can gain eﬃciency by expanding their volume and num-
ber of participants because of economies of scale and scope and network
externalities.23 Consistent with these arguments, the literature has found
the size of the economy to be an important factor for the development of
liquid, well-functioning securities markets. See, for example, McCauley
and Remolona (2000) and Shah and Thomas (200).
Finally, to test whether the level of stock market development in Latin
America diﬀers from that predicted from fundamentals, we include a Latin
American dummy variable, which takes the value one if the country is lo-
cated in Latin America and the Caribbean and zero otherwise.24 If stock
market development in Latin America is close to the level predicted by the
region’s fundamentals, this dummy should not be signiﬁcant.
After removing outliers, countries with missing data on the independent
variables, and countries with less than ﬁve annual observations, we are left
with a sample of ninety-ﬁve countries covering the period 1975 to 2004.25
The sample includes eighteen Latin American countries, which account on
average for seventeen percent of the observations used in the regressions.26
In all cases, we pool the data over time and across countries. Regarding the
estimation technique, we use least squares estimators adjusting the stan-
dard errors for clustering at the country level.27
4.3.2 Regression Results
The results for stock market capitalization over GDP, value traded over
GDP, and capital raised over GDP are presented in tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3,
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22. Bekaert et al. (2006) use two country-speciﬁc industry weightings to calculate each
country’s growth opportunities index. One is based on the relative market capitalization of
each industry in the local stock market. The other one is based on the relative value added of
each industry in the respective country. We report the results using the latter weighting
scheme but also estimated the regressions using the former and obtained similar results.
23. Network eﬀects are an intrinsic feature of securities trading: the beneﬁts of participat-
ing in a given market increase with the number of participants (Economides 1993, 1996; Di
Noia 1999). This generates positive feedback, as a liquid market attracts more participants
and each new participant brings additional trading opportunities and liquidity, beneﬁting all
market participants and making the market more attractive to others. There is also evidence
of economies of scale in stock exchange activities, especially regarding order execution
(Malkamaki 1999).
24. For deﬁning this dummy we consider the World Bank regional classiﬁcation, which in-
cludes Latin American and Caribbean countries. We also estimated all the regressions ex-
cluding the Caribbean countries and obtained similar results.
25. We also estimated the regressions constraining the sample to countries with at least
three annual observations and without imposing any restrictions on the number of observa-
tions and obtained results similar to those reported in the paper in both cases.
26. See table 4A.1 for the list of countries covered.
27. We also estimated all the regressions using panel feasible generalized least squared
(FGLS), allowing for heteroscedastic error structures and diﬀerent autocorrelation coeﬃ-
cients within countries, and obtained similar results.respectively. The tables provide in the ﬁrst column the results for a regres-
sion with GDP per capita, inﬂation, and capital account liberalization as
the only explanatory variables. The tables then report a regression with gov-
ernment deﬁcit over GDP instead of inﬂation as these two constitute alter-
native indicators of macroeconomic soundness and stability. To keep the
size of the tables manageable, we just continue to use one of the macro vari-
ables, government deﬁcit over GDP.28 In the third and fourth column, the
tables report regressions with the stock market liberalization index and eq-
uity ﬂows as a percentage of GDP, respectively, replacing the capital ac-
count liberalization dummy. In the ﬁfth and sixth columns, the shareholder
rights index is introduced. In the sixth column, we include the growth op-
portunities measure. In the seventh and eighth columns, we control for GDP
instead of GDP per capita. We do not include GDP and GDP per capita in
the same speciﬁcation as these variables are highly correlated.29 Note, how-
ever, that all our results are robust to controlling for both variables and to
replacing GDP per capita with GDP. We discuss the results in turn.
The regression results for market capitalization as a ratio of GDP (table
4.1) indicate that stock market development in our sample is related to the
variables in ways already identiﬁed in the literature. In particular, GDP per
capita, ﬁnancial openness (measured by stock market liberalization and
equity ﬂows over GDP), shareholder rights, and the size of the economy
are positively and signiﬁcantly associated with market capitalization, while
government deﬁcits are negatively related to stock market development.
The growth opportunities variable enters positively and signiﬁcantly in the
regressions.
More relevant for our analysis, the dummy variable for Latin America
enters negatively and signiﬁcantly in all the speciﬁcations. The eﬀect is also
economically relevant: the average coeﬃcient for the dummy in these re-
gressions is –0.17, which means that market capitalization over GDP in
Latin American countries is on average 17 percentage points below the level
predicted by their fundamentals and policies. This is a large diﬀerence,
given that the average market capitalization over GDP for Latin American
countries in these regressions is 18 percent.
Similar conclusions are obtained when analyzing value traded domesti-
cally over GDP (table 4.2).Most of the control variables have the expected
sign: more developed countries, with sounder macroeconomic policies and
more ﬁnancial openness, tend to have higher trading activity. Also, coun-
tries with better growth opportunities have more domestic trading. The
dummy for Latin American countries enters negatively and signiﬁcantly at
the 1 percent level in all the speciﬁcations, indicating that countries in the
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28. We choose this variable because inﬂation is not statistically signiﬁcant in most regres-
sions. We obtained results similar to those reported in the paper when controlling for both in-
ﬂation and ﬁscal deﬁcit.
29. The correlation between the logarithm of GDP per capita and the logarithm of GDP is

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.region have lower value traded domestically than warranted by their fun-
damentals.
When analyzing capital raised domestically over GDP (table 4.3),we ﬁnd
similar results as for the other two measures of stock market develop-
ment, although fewer variables are statistically signiﬁcant, in part due to the
lumpy and volatile nature of capital raising activity. Countries with sounder
macro policies tend to see more capital raising, although government deﬁcit
over GDP is not always statistically signiﬁcant. More open countries (as
measured by equity ﬂows over GDP), as well as countries with a better le-
gal protection of shareholder rights and more growth opportunities, also
have higher capital raising activity. The Latin American dummy enters neg-
atively and signiﬁcantly at the 1 percent level in all speciﬁcations.
Overall, the results in tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 yield similar conclusions:
countries with higher income, sounder macroeconomic policies, better
protection of shareholder rights, greater ﬁnancial openness, larger econ-
omies, and higher growth opportunities, have more developed local stock
markets. Regarding Latin America, the results indicate that there is a
shortfall in the actual development of stock markets in the region, relative
to its fundamentals. In other words, Latin American countries have lower
stock market development than countries with similar fundamentals and
policies in other regions.
4.3.3 Robustness Tests
The results presented in this section show that stock markets in Latin
American are below what can be expected, given the region’s economic and
institutional fundamentals and policies. Given the relevance of these re-
sults, we subjected them to a number of robustness tests by including sev-
eral additional control variables suggested by the literature on capital mar-
ket development.
First, we controlled for macroeconomic volatility as the empirical evi-
dence suggests that the depth of domestic ﬁnancial systems is inversely re-
lated to volatility (see, for example, IDB 1995). To the extent that macro-
economic volatility might have been higher in Latin America than in other
regions and was not fully captured by the control variables included in the
regressions, this could explain the negative sign and statistical signiﬁcance
of the Latin American dummy.30 To address this issue, we reestimated the
regressions including measures of inﬂation and interest rate volatility at dif-
ferent time horizons.31 We ﬁnd that these variables tend to have a negative
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30. Note that the regressions include two indicators of macroeconomic soundness, the an-
nual inﬂation rate and the government deﬁcit over GDP.
31. We controlled for the volatility of inﬂation and real interest rates over the previous
three, ﬁve, and ten years. Also, as Boyd, Levine, and Smith (2001) highlight the nonlinear re-
lation between inﬂation and ﬁnancial-sector performance, we explored nonlinear eﬀects of
inﬂation on stock market development. Although the results suggest that nonlinear eﬀects











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.(although usually not statistically signiﬁcant) relation with stock market
development, but their inclusion does not aﬀect the sign and signiﬁcance of
the Latin American dummy. Also, the size of the coeﬃcients on this dummy
is mostly unaﬀected by the inclusion of these controls.
Second, the lower level of stock market development in Latin American
countries may be due to a worse institutional environment in these coun-
tries, which was not adequately captured by the control variables used in
the regressions. To address this issue, we included a number of additional
measures of the quality of the institutional framework. In particular, we
controlled for indicators of corruption, bureaucratic quality, law and or-
der, political risk, government stability, and investment proﬁle developed
by International Country Risk Guide; an index of the quality of account-
ing standards constructed by Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2004); and
diﬀerent proxies for the functioning of the judicial system, including the
time it takes to resolve disputes (Djankov et al. 2003) and an index of the
overall eﬃciency of the judicial system, as reported by Business Interna-
tional Corporation. We also controlled for a country’s legal tradition, as this
has been found to be associated with the protection of shareholder rights
(La Porta et al. 1997, 1998), the eﬃciency of the judicial system (Djankov
et al. 2003), and the protection of property rights (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt,
and Levine 2003). While many of these variables are statistically signiﬁcant
and have the sign suggested by the literature, the Latin American dummy
remains statistically signiﬁcant and negative and the size of its coeﬃcients
is mostly unchanged.
Finally, we controlled for the level of savings in each country. A higher
savings level means that more local resources are available to be invested 
in the domestic ﬁnancial system and therefore may be associated with 
a higher stock market development (see, for example, Garcia and Liu
1999).32 The relative underdevelopment of stock markets in Latin America
may be explained by the low savings rate in the region.33 To address this is-
sue, we reestimated the regressions controlling for savings as a percentage
of GDP. This variable tends to be positive (although usually not statisti-
cally signiﬁcant); however, its inclusion does not aﬀect the sign, signiﬁ-
cance, or size of the Latin American dummy.
Although more research is needed, the robustness of the results indicates
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32. Causality may also run in the other direction, from more developed ﬁnancial markets
to higher savings. For instance, deeper domestic ﬁnancial markets may oﬀer investors more
investment opportunities and higher returns, potentially resulting in more savings. To address
this concern, we use savings lagged one period.
33. Savings rates in Latin America have stagnated over the last two decades, standing at
about 17 percent of GDP. In contrast, savings in East Asia averaged more than 30 percent of
GDP over this period. Several studies have pointed to low savings rates in Latin America as
a signiﬁcant constraint to the region’s growth (see, for example, Edwards [1995] and Schmidt-
Hebbel and Serven [1997]). See Plies and Reinhart (1999) for an overview of the behavior of
savings in Latin America.that it is diﬃcult to identify the factors behind the underdevelopment of
Latin American capital markets. This suggests that certain characteristics
of Latin American countries, beyond those usually highlighted in the liter-
ature on capital market development, limit the scope for developing deep
domestic securities markets in the region.
4.4 What Went Wrong and What to Do Next? 
The evidence reported in sections 4.2 and 4.3 shows that capital markets
in Latin America are underdeveloped, not only compared to markets in
East Asia and industrialized nations, but also relative to the level predicted
by the region’s fundamentals and policies. We now turn to the analysis of
these two ﬁndings to draw lessons for the capital market reform agenda go-
ing forward. Assessing the evidence is a process that, by nature, involves
signiﬁcant resort to judgment calls. There is thus ample scope for diﬀer-
ing yet reasonable explanations for the gap between expectations and out-
comes. This section aims at providing a ﬂavor of the range of perspectives
on this question by identifying three typological views. This typology is
used mainly for presentational purposes, to help depict the nature of the
debate and highlight the policy issues under discussion. A more detailed
discussion of these issues is presented in de la Torre and Schmukler (2006).
The ﬁrst view, encapsulated in the message “be patient and redouble 
the eﬀort,” ascribes the observed gap between outcomes and expectations
to a combination of insuﬃcient reform implementation with impatience. In
eﬀect, despite what many claim, key reforms were in some cases not even ini-
tiated, while other reforms were often implemented in an incomplete or in-
consistent fashion. In many cases, laws and regulations were approved, but
they were not duly implemented, nor were they adequately enforced.34
Moreover, policymakers have been too impatient, often expecting results to
materialize sooner than warranted. However, complex reforms tend to have
long gestation periods. According to proponents of this view, the emphasis
going forward should be on forging ahead persistently with the hard work
of improving the enabling environment for capital markets; enhancing
market discipline through greater competition; upgrading the regulatory
and supervisory framework for securities markets; and improving key areas
such as accounting and disclosure standards, corporate governance prac-
tices, and securities trading, custody, clearing, and settlement systems.35
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34. To the extent that the quality of reforms was lower in Latin America and the control
variables used in our regressions did not capture this diﬀerence, this could explain the signif-
icance and negative sign of the Latin American dummy.
35. This is broadly consistent with our empirical ﬁndings, as our results show that econ-
omies with sounder macro policies, better protection of shareholder rights, and greater open-
ness tend to have more developed stock markets. Also consistent with this view, de la Torre,
Gozzi, and Schmukler (2006) ﬁnd that capital market-related reforms tend to be followed by
signiﬁcant increases in domestic stock market capitalization, trading, and capital raising.The second view, encapsulated in the message “get the sequence right,”
claims that the gap between outcomes and expectations is due to faulty re-
form sequencing. This view contends that capital market reforms were—
to one degree or another—part of the problem rather than the solution and
draws attention to the problems that arise from the adoption of certain re-
forms before others are in place.36 The most familiar rendition of this view
focuses on the pitfalls of premature ﬁnancial market liberalization, argu-
ing that liberalizing the ﬁnancial system before achieving a minimum
threshold of institutional strength—in terms of the legal and regulatory
framework, supervisory capacity, accounting and disclosure standards,
and so forth—is likely to exacerbate distortions in ﬁnancial markets.37 Ac-
cording to proponents of this view, the task of recasting the reform agenda
going forward hinges on the success of eﬀorts devoted to systematically
clarifying sequencing issues.
The third view, encapsulated in the message “revisit basic issues and re-
shape expectations,” arises from the identiﬁcation of shortcomings in the
previous two views. This view focuses on the gaps in our knowledge and is,
as a result, much less prescriptive. It contends that policy initiatives need
to take into account the intrinsic characteristics of developing countries
(such as small size, lack of risk diversiﬁcation opportunities, presence of
weak currencies, and prevalence of systemic risk), and how these features
limit the scope for developing deep domestic capital markets. These limi-
tations are diﬃcult to overcome by the reform process. This view therefore
calls for a more varied reform agenda, as a one-size-ﬁts-all approach is des-
tined to fail. It emphasizes that a key step in designing country-speciﬁc re-
forms going forward should be a determination of whether the emerging
economy in question can sustain an active domestic market for private
sector securities. It also argues that ultimately, any reform agenda for cap-
ital markets needs to be couched within a broader vision of ﬁnancial de-
velopment for emerging markets in the context of international ﬁnancial
integration.
Confronting the ﬁrst two views with relevant aspects of the evidence
leads to the conclusion that important things are inadequately addressed
by them. Perhaps the most questionable aspect of both views, in light of the
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36. To the extent that reform sequencing in Latin America was imperfect and worse than in
other regions and that the control variables used in our regressions failed to capture this
diﬀerence, this may account for the sign and signiﬁcance of the Latin American dummy in the
regressions.
37. A standard policy recommendation therefore is to upgrade the ﬁnancial regulation and
supervision and improve the health of the ﬁnancial system before deregulating ﬁnancial mar-
kets and opening up the capital account (see, for example, Johnston and Sundararajan [1999]
and McKinnon [1993]). Not all sequencing arguments are related to ﬁnancial liberalization.
Some emphasize the building block nature of ﬁnancial development, whereby interlinkages
across diﬀerent markets make certain reforms necessary for the success of others (see, for ex-
ample, Karacadag, Sundararajan, and Elliott 2003).evidence presented in this paper, is their implicit assumption that domes-
tic capital market development in emerging economies should be mea-
sured against the benchmark of capital markets in industrialized countries.
For the ﬁrst two views, the reform path may be long and diﬃcult, and it
may require an adequate sequencing of reforms, but the expected outcome
is, in most cases, only one. The expectation is that, as reforms advance, do-
mestic capital markets in emerging markets will increasingly resemble
those in developed countries. But it is diﬃcult to accept this premise given
the evidence presented so far. Despite the intense reform eﬀorts, capital
markets in Latin America remain underdeveloped, not only compared to
other regions, but also relative to the level predicted by the region’s funda-
mentals and policies. These results suggest that certain characteristics of
Latin American countries, beyond those usually highlighted in the capital
market reform literature, limit the scope for developing deep domestic
markets. Therefore, it is very diﬃcult to pinpoint which policies Latin
American countries should pursue to overcome the lack of development of
their capital markets.
A salient characteristic of many emerging economies that the reform de-
bate has failed to adequately take into account is their small size. Sec-
ondary market liquidity is a positive function of market size and the related
network and agglomeration eﬀects. Consistent with this idea, our results
show that the size of the economy is positively related to domestic stock
market development. The small size of many emerging economies may
therefore present a signiﬁcant structural barrier for developing deep and
liquid domestic markets. However, this factor alone does not account for
the observed lack of capital market development in Latin America, as our
estimations show that the regional dummy remains negative and signiﬁ-
cant when controlling for size. In the case of Latin America, the adverse
eﬀect of smallness may be exacerbated by the higher concentration exhib-
ited by markets in the region (de la Torre and Schmukler 2006). In eﬀect, a
general pattern in Latin American markets is that only few ﬁrms are ca-
pable of issuing securities in amounts that meet the minimum thresholds
for liquidity, and these securities are mostly purchased by few institutional
investors that tend to follow buy and hold strategies, further contributing
to low trading activity. In the case of equity markets, lack of trading is also
the result of low ﬂoat ratios (a low percentage of listed shares available for
trading), reﬂecting concentrated ownership patterns and the reluctance to
give up control. To the extent that these characteristics are more prevalent
in Latin America than in other regions, this may account for the signiﬁ-
cance of the Latin American dummy in our regressions.
The policy discussion on capital market reform has tended to focus on
the development of domestic ﬁnancial systems. This fails to reﬂect the fact
that, in a globalized context, ﬁnancial development has much to do with
the extent and type of integration with international ﬁnancial markets. Fi-
Capital Market Development: Whither Latin America? 141nancial globalization calls for a more general approach to understanding
ﬁnancial development—one that looks at the domestic and international
sides of the process simultaneously. In this perspective, successful ﬁnancial
development is best characterized as the sustainable deepening and broad-
ening of access to ﬁnancial services, regardless of whether such services are
provided at home or abroad, by securities markets or other markets. A
greater attention to ﬁnancial globalization does not imply, however, that
the much wider scope for cross-border ﬁnancial contracting resulting from
globalization renders domestic markets useless. It is diﬃcult to imagine
that international ﬁnancial markets would become a perfect substitute of
local markets in every respect.38Thus, the point is not to deny the relevance
of local ﬁnancial markets but to stress that such relevance acquires mean-
ing under globalization to the extent that domestic markets are a comple-
ment, rather than a substitute, to the international market integration.
One signiﬁcant policy concern about the ﬁnancial globalization process
is that the increasing migration of ﬁrms to international ﬁnancial centers
may aﬀect domestic stock markets adversely as too little activity remains
at home.39 This might help to explain our empirical results, as the evidence
shows that the level of internationalization of Latin American stock mar-
kets far exceeds that of other regions (de la Torre and Schmukler 2006). To
the extent that this higher level of internationalization was not captured by
the controls included in our regressions and that internationalization ad-
versely aﬀects domestic markets, this may explain the sign and signiﬁcance
of the Latin American dummy.
4.5 Conclusions
In this paper, we analyzed the state of capital markets in Latin America.
We found that despite the intense reform eﬀort, capital markets in the re-
gion remain underdeveloped compared to markets in East Asia and de-
veloped countries. Furthermore, we found that stock markets in Latin
America are below what can be expected, given the region’s economic and
institutional fundamentals. In particular, our results indicate that there is
a shortfall in domestic stock market activity (market capitalization, trad-
ing, and capital raising) in the region after controlling for many factors, in-
cluding per capita income, macroeconomic policies, the size of the econ-
omy, and measures of the legal and institutional environment.
We described alternative ways of interpreting this evidence and dis-
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38. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004) ﬁnd that local ﬁnancial development is an im-
portant determinant of the economic success of ﬁrms (especially smaller ones) even in an en-
vironment where there are no frictions to capital movements.
39. A number of publications have expressed concerns that local markets are becoming
illiquid due to internationalization (see, for example, Bovespa 1996; Federation des Bourses
de Valeurs 2000; Financial Times 1998; Latin Finance 1999; and The Economist 2001).cussed the lessons for the reform agenda. We argued that two stylized views
dominate the current debate. The ﬁrst contends that the gap between ex-
pectations and outcomes is due to the combination of impatience with im-
perfect and incomplete reform eﬀorts. The second claims that the gap is
due to faulty reform sequencing. Though diﬀering in diagnoses and policy
prescriptions, these views are not necessarily incompatible, and both cap-
ture important aspects of the problem at hand. Our main argument, how-
ever, is that neither of the two views may adequately address a number of
salient questions posed by the evidence. The third, complementary view is
much less prescriptive. It highlights the need to step back, revisit certain
basic issues, and reshape expectations, as a prior step to ensure more solid
grounds for a reformulation of the reform agenda.
Our study comes with several caveats. Although we used as explanatory
variables what we believe are the main drivers of stock market develop-
ment, some variables were not included. For example, the quality of the
banking system and securities market infrastructure (like the eﬃciency and
reliability of clearing and settlement systems) may be important determi-
nants of domestic market development. Furthermore, it is possible that the
variables we used as controls are too general and fail to capture speciﬁc as-
pects of the institutional and regulatory framework that are particularly
relevant for domestic stock market development. To the extent that Latin
American countries score worse than other countries in those respects, this
may help to explain the signiﬁcance and negative sign of the Latin Ameri-
can dummy in our regressions. However, one potential diﬃculty in per-
forming empirical analysis is that some factors that are relevant for capital
market development may show little or no variation over time, making it
diﬃcult to separate their eﬀects from those of a simple regional dummy. Fi-
nally, while we discussed diﬀerent factors that may explain our results, we
kept the discussion at a general level and have not evaluated our hypothe-
ses empirically. Thus, we believe that our conclusions should remain ten-
tative and that further research is needed to identify the factors behind the
lower level of capital market development in Latin America unearthed by
our analyses.
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Comment Ugo Panizza
In this paper Augusto de la Torre, Juan Carlos Gozzi, and Sergio
Schmukler analyze the impact of ﬁnancial reforms on the development of
the Latin American capital market and provide possible explanations of
why the reform process did not yield the expected results.
The paper contrasts two possible views of the dismal outcome of the 
reform process. The ﬁrst view is the one maintained by the Talibans of 
the Washington consensus and is summarized by de la Torre, Gozzi, and
Schmukler as “be patient and redouble the eﬀort.” The second view still
maintains that reforms could have a beneﬁcial eﬀect but claims that there
was a problem with the sequencing of the reforms process. De la Torre,
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Ugo Panizza is chief of the Debt and Finance Analysis Unit in the Division on Globaliza-
tion and Development Strategies at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment (UNCTAD).Gozzi, and Schmukler label this position as the “get the sequence right”
view.1De la Torre, Gozzi, and Schmukler argue that both views capture im-
portant aspects of the problem but neither of them is fully satisfactory and
propose a third view that they label “revisit basic issues and reshape ex-
pectations.” In particular, de la Torre, Gozzi, and Schmukler make the
point that it is not easy to identify which policies should be pursued to fos-
ter the development of the Latin American capital market and that ex-
pectations about the outcome of the reform process should be adjusted.
Furthermore, they recognize that there are intrinsic characteristics of
emerging market countries that may limit the development of their capital
markets.
I tend to agree with this conclusion. In fact, in a recent paper on the de-
velopment of the Latin American bond market written with Eduardo
Borensztein and Barry Eichengreen, we conclude that “While this clearly
does not mean that policies and institutions do not matter [for the devel-
opment of the Latin American bond market], it means that there is no con-
venient short-cut . . . the same policies that are necessary for economic de-
velopment in general are also necessary for the development of domestic
bond markets” (Borensztein, Eichengreen, and Panizza 2006, 21).
As I agree with the big picture, I will focus my discussion on some of the
details of de la Torre, Gozzi, and Schmukler’s work. A way of doing so is to
frame my discussion as if it were the outline of a “shadow paper,” that is,
the paper I would like to write if I were asked to rewrite de la Torre, Gozzi,
and Schmukler’s paper.2
The Shadow Paper
As there seem to be a disconnect between the title and the content of de
la Torre, Gozzi, and Schmukler’s paper (the title talks about capital mar-
ket, but the paper is really about the development of the stock market), I
would title my shadow paper: “StockMarket Development: Whither Latin
America.”
As in de la Torre, Gozzi, and Schmukler, I would start by comparing the
development of Latin America’s stock market with those of East Asia and
the industrial countries. However, I would put more attention on the met-
ric used to compare these markets. This is not an irrelevant detail. Look,
for instance, at ﬁgure 4C.1 and 4C.2 (both taken from Borensztein, Eichen-
green, and Panizza 2006). These ﬁgures compare the development of the
government, corporate, and ﬁnancial bond markets in Latin America, East
Asia, and industrial countries. Figure 4C.1 scales the size of the bond mar-
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1. Interestingly, de la Torre, Gozzi, and Schmukler do not mention a third view. This is the
view of the antiglobalizers who are extremely critical of any type of market friendly reform.
2. Clearly, my shadow paper is a rhetorical device that has the beneﬁt of hindsight because
it internalizes what I learned by reading de la Torre, Gozzi, and Schmukler’s work. Further-
more, it allows me to say what I would like to do without the need of actually doing it.ket by gross domestic product (GDP) and ﬁgure 4C.2 scales the size of the
bond market by domestic credit. Focus for the moment on the columns
with no controls. In ﬁgure 4C.1, we ﬁnd that the industrial countries have
the largest bond market, followed by East Asia (with a bond market which
is 60 percent smaller than that of industrial countries), and Latin America
(with a bond market which is 30 percent smaller than that of East Asia). In
ﬁgure 4C.2, we still ﬁnd that the industrial countries have the largest bond
market, but we now ﬁnd that Latin America has a bond market that is 20
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Fig. 4C.1 Outstanding bonds over GDP, with controls and without controls
(simple average, 1991–2004)
Source: Borensztein, Eichengreen, and Panizza (2006).
Fig. 4C.2 Outstanding bonds over domestic credit, with controls and without 
controls (simple average, 1991–2004)
Source: Borensztein, Eichengreen, and Panizza (2006).percent larger than that of East Asia (furthermore, the diﬀerence with re-
spect to industrial countries goes from 73 to 41 percent). This suggests that
while Latin American bond markets are small relative to GDP, they are not
so small relative to the size of the domestic ﬁnancial sector. Hence, it is the
Latin American ﬁnancial sector and not merely the bond market that is un-
derdeveloped. It would be interesting to conduct a similar experiment fo-
cusing on the Latin American stock market and check if there is something
speciﬁc about this particular segment of the region’s ﬁnancial system or if,
as in the case of the bond market, the underdevelopment of the Latin
American stock market is just another aspect of the level of ﬁnancial un-
derdevelopment that characterizes Latin America.
After having compared simple averages (and possibly weighted aver-
ages), I would also follow de la Torre, Gozzi, and Schmukler and conduct
a formal statistical analysis of the main drivers of cross-country diﬀerences
in stock market development. Here, I have two issues with de la Torre,
Gozzi, and Schmukler’s approach. The ﬁrst has to do with the set of ex-
planatory variables included in the model and the second with the set of
countries included in the sample.
Although de la Torre, Gozzi, and Schmukler do not lack degrees of free-
dom (their smaller sample has more than 400 observations, and in most
cases they have more than 1,000 observations), they decided to adopt an
extremely parsimonious speciﬁcation with at most ﬁve explanatory vari-
ables plus a dummy for Latin America. As a consequence, they manage to
explain a rather small share of the variance of stock market development
(up to 45 percent of it in one regression but less than 25 percent in most re-
gressions). I would deﬁnitely try to include a larger number of explanatory
variables and report the regressions that include these explanatory vari-
ables.3Besides the variables mentioned by de la Torre, Gozzi, and Schmuk-
ler in their “Robustness Test” section, I would also include the squares of
log GDP and log GDP per capita (to better control for nonlinearities), the
eﬀect of measures of the eﬃciency of the banking system (like banking
spreads and bank concentration), the overall size of the ﬁnancial system,
and the eﬀect of having large institutional investors (for instance, the eﬀect
of having privatized pension systems). Controlling for the overall size of
the ﬁnancial system is particularly important because it would allow me to
check whether there is something speciﬁc about the stock market or
whether having a small stock market is just another manifestation of ﬁ-
nancial underdevelopment. In the concluding section of their paper, de la
Torre, Gozzi, and Schmukler recognize that there are a host of variables
that they do not include in their analysis, and some of these variables are
exactly the ones mentioned in the preceding. They argue that these vari-
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3. De la Torre, Gozzi, and Schmukler include some extra explanatory variables in a ro-
bustness section but do not report the regressions that include these variables.ables are not included because they do not vary much over time; hence, it
is diﬃcult to separate their eﬀect from that of the Latin America and
Caribbean (LAC) dummy. This argument is not fully convincing. First of
all, the authors do include shareholder rights, which is a variable that does
not vary over time (not because it cannot change but because there are no
panel data on this variable). Second, I will argue later that it would be in-
teresting to decompose the factors that explain the diﬀerence between
Latin America and industrial countries into three groups, and having in-
formation on such time-invariant variables would help us in such a de-
composition (especially because some of these variables like shareholder
rights, bank concentration, and bank eﬃciency could be object of policy
and hence change over time).4
I would also augment the model with a full set of regional ﬁxed eﬀects.
For instance, I would add three dummy variables, one for East Asia, one
for East Europe and Central Asia, and for other developing countries (in-
dustrial countries would be the excluded dummy). By doing so, I would be
able to test whether the Latin America dummy is mostly capturing the
diﬀerence between Latin America and the industrial countries or whether
there are also signiﬁcant diﬀerences between Latin America and other de-
veloping regions (my tables would provide F-tests on the diﬀerence be-
tween the LAC dummy and each of the other regional dummies included
in the various regressions).
Finally, I would relax the assumption that the relationship between the
explanatory variables and the dependent variables is homogenous across
countries and reestimate the model by restricting the sample to emerging
market countries. This is important because Borensztein, Eichengreen,
and Panizza’s (2006) study of the determinants of bond market develop-
ment and show that certain results (the eﬀect of capital controls, for in-
stance) reverse when industrial countries are excluded from the sample.5
After having estimated the model, I would use its results to perform two
sets of comparisons.
First, I would use the regional dummies to evaluate which share of the
diﬀerence with respect to industrial countries can be explained by the fac-
tors included in the various regressions. This is not very diﬀerent from what
de la Torre, Gozzi, and Schmukler do when they look at the LAC dummy.
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4. I would also include year ﬁxed eﬀects to control for common trends.
5. Another issue has to do with sample size. Consider, for instance, table 4.1 in de la Torre,
Gozzi, and Schmukler. The ﬁrst column includes eighty-seven countries (and over 1,600 ob-
servations), and the last column includes forty-ﬁve countries (and 836 observations). It would
be interesting to know what would happen if I were to estimate the model of columns (1) to
(5) using the sample of column (6). Also, note that table 4A.1 lists ninety-ﬁve countries, but
the regressions of tables 4.1 to 4.3 use at most eighty-seven countries and in most cases less
than eighty countries. It would be good to know which countries are included in the various
regressions or at least how many countries for each region (LAC, East Asia, East Europe, in-
dustrial countries, other emerging market countries).However, by having included other regional dummies in the model and a
much larger set of explanatory variables, I would be able to have a clearer
picture. Consider again ﬁgures 4C.1 and 4C.2, and now focus on the col-
umns with controls. These columns show what would happen to the bond
markets of Latin America and East Asia if these regions had the same
country characteristics as the industrial countries. The ﬁgures show that
when we scale the size of the bond market by GDP, the diﬀerence between
Latin America and industrial countries drops drastically but remains large
(without controls the Latin American bond market is less than one-third
that of industrial countries, but after we control for country characteristics,
the relative size of the Latin American bond market more than doubles and
reaches 70 percent of the size of the industrial countries’ bond market). In
the case of East Asia, instead, we ﬁnd that country characteristics fully ex-
plain the diﬀerence with respect to industrial countries. Interestingly, if we
scale bond market by domestic credit, we ﬁnd that if we were to assign to
Latin America the same country characteristics of the industrial countries
we would ﬁnd a substantial drop in the size of the Latin American bond
market.6 It would be very interesting to conduct a similar analysis for the
stock market.
Second, I would use the point estimates to separate the impact of three
types of variables: (a) historical and geographical variables (like latitude,
origin of the legal code, colonial history, etc.); (b) variables that measure
country size or the level of development (GDP, GDP per capita, rule of law,
ﬁnancial development, etc.); (c) policy variables (shareholder rights, gov-
ernment deﬁcit, stock market liberalization, privatization, etc.). Such a de-
composition is interesting because it would tell me how policies could help
me to close the gap with industrial countries. Suppose, for instance, that we
were to ﬁnd that 30 percent of the diﬀerence between average stock market
capitalization in Latin America and industrial countries is not explained
by our model (this is the LAC dummy); another 30 percent is explained by
geographical and historical variables; another 30 percent by country size,
the level of development, and ﬁnancial development; and the remaining 10
percent by policy variables. Then we would know that changes in policies
would have a limited direct eﬀect on the size of the stock market (they
could have a larger indirect eﬀect if they aﬀect GDP growth and the size of
the ﬁnancial system). This is important because it would help policymak-
ers in forming the right expectations on the impact of the reform process
and also in conducting cost beneﬁt analyses of the process of ﬁnancial re-
forms. Note that this decomposition is very close to what is implicitly done
by de la Torre, Gozzi, and Schmukler, and the potential results from such
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6. This is due to the negative relationship between the size of the ﬁnancial market and the
ratio between government bonds and domestic credit. As average domestic credit in indus-
trial countries is about three times that of Latin America if we substitute the value of domes-
tic credit of industrial countries into Latin America we obtain a much smaller bond market.a decomposition are likely to be consistent with their view “revisit basic is-
sues and reshape expectations.” In fact, presenting the results of such a de-
composition is likely to strengthen, by quantifying it, the authors’ main
message.
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